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The Politics of Consciousness
Kurt Spellmeyer
The original title of this essay was “the Politics of Mindfulness.” Mindfulness, after all, has truly arrived—as we know because Time magazine told us so in 
a 2014 feature story. The cover photograph shows a woman—young, white, blond and 
beautiful—her lids closed above the words, “The Mindful Revolution.” Mindfulness has 
become so popular it almost rivals yoga, but it diverges from yoga in important ways. 
Yoga has inspired a subculture appealing primarily to women in the PMC, the profes-
sional-managerial class.1 Mindfulness, by contrast, is less gendered, and its influence has 
spread differently—not only to middle management but also to the uppermost echelons 
of American corporate culture. Almost every week, it seems, another CEO in the Huff-
ington Post celebrates its benefits. Like yoga, mindfulness has roots in ancient India, and 
much can be learned from a study of the roles it once played in that setting. But how are 
we to understand mindfulness in the context of our time and place, especially now that it 
has arrived in America’s classrooms? 
There’s no way to answer that question, though, if we focus solely on the testimonials 
of meditators who spend hours on a mat, watching the breath go in and out. Nor will we 
get a satisfactory account from psychologists, therapists, and brain scientists. We have 
to step back from individuals to consider the larger society. But as soon as we shift from 
individuals to their interactions with each other, we enter the domain of politics—not 
the kind of politics we read about in New York Times, but politics in the sense Aristotle 
meant: our collective creation of the life we share. And once we start to think politically, 
the limits of the word “mindfulness” will become clearer.
Speaking as someone who has practiced meditation almost every day for more than 
forty years, I cannot praise it highly enough as a subjective experience. My meditation 
regimen has carried me through all kinds of tragedies and traumas, and I’m quite con-
vinced it has made life easier for those who have interacted with me in some way, as col-
leagues, employees and students, or as members of my family. If we multiply the benefits 
I’ve received by, say, ten or twenty million, the result could be quite substantial. But then 
again, maybe not. Even if everyone in the United States adopted some form of medi-
tation, normative structures would stay in place, especially our economic system. And 
other structures would remain unchanged, too—what Raymond Williams calls “struc-
tures of feeling,” as well as the taken-for-granted lifeworld which is a product of a history 
that includes patriarchy, genocide, slavery, and so on (Williams 129; Husserl 127-28). 
Not only mindfulness but many forms of meditation can take us to a state of mind 
where everything feels alive and new, unobstructed and unchanging. I’ve been there 
myself quite often. Yet that experience of a timeless here-and-now still exists within his-
tory because, of course, that’s where we ourselves exist. And in the world that history 
1. According to a 2008 market research study commissioned by Yoga Magazine, 72% of yoga 
practitioners are women. Forty-four percent earn more than $75,000 a year, while 24% earn more 
than $100,000 (http://www.statisticbrain. com/yoga-statistics/). Seventy-seven percent are college-
educated, and 27% have graduate degrees (https://thesocietypages. orgsocimages/2011/09/14/
exclusion-and-american-yoga/;https://www.namasta.com/press-resources/).
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has made, even the noblest ideas can be used to exploit and manipulate others. This is 
why Marxist thinkers adopted the concept of “ideology,” pointing beyond ideas to their 
strategic use in the political sphere. What holds true for ideas, however, applies also to 
practices of mental cultivation as well as altered states. They can be used to imprison as 
well as liberate, and to mystify as well as reveal. Because meditation is new to the West, 
it seems to be immune to these concerns, but this illusion dissipates once we recognize 
that mindfulness has a history—the history of consciousness. 
The Turn to Consciousness
“Mindfulness” is trending, true enough, but ours is not the first occasion when edu-
cated people in the West responded to rapid social change by making a deliberate effort 
to transform their mental habits. Such a transformation occupied a central place in the 
work of the nineteenth century’s most influential thinker, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel. Even those unfamiliar with Hegel’s work know from writers like Dickens, Zola, 
and Hauptmann how very difficult conditions were—and not just for those living in the 
West’s colonies, routinely subjected to forced labor, compulsory attendance at schools 
designed to exterminate their cultures, and the denial of their most basic rights. Life was 
nearly unbearable, too, for ordinary men and women in the West before labor unions, 
Social Security, Medicare and free public education. At least 20% of Great Britain was 
“itinerant, homeless and hungry,” and the great majority lived in poverty or on the edge 
of being poor (Howden-Chapman, Englander). The unemployed, by the thousands, 
made their homes on the street, selling their labor, their bodies, or stealing whatever they 
could steal. Try as the educated classes might to avoid the grim spectacle, its magnitude 
called into question modernity itself.
Hegel’s solution wasn’t mindfulness, but he taught that how we think and act are the 
products of our consciousness, and he argued that we can transform reality by learning 
to think in new ways. Indeed, he said that people do this all the time without becom-
ing consciously aware: at the moments we feel most trapped or blocked, we begin to rei-
magine our relations to the world, and the new paradigm allows us move forward once 
again. This process, Hegel argued, happens automatically, arising from a force within 
consciousness, a force Hegel called Spirit or Mind, which, according to his Phenom-
enology, constantly labors to overcome every new contradiction between experience and 
existing knowledge (Hegel 51-52, 479-93). Hegel didn’t tell his followers to meditate, 
but he created a new way for the people of his day to regard their situation: even when 
conditions looked hopeless, he said, things are going work out because Mind is on the 
case. Some inspired person will devise exactly the solution we need. Our task as indi-
viduals is to follow the lead of these people—visionaries such as Hegel himself—or to 
become great visionaries ourselves.
As the heroes of the story Hegel told, intellectuals eagerly embraced his philoso-
phy as a solution to their self-doubt and despair, and it allowed them to see themselves 
as agents of change, instead of hangers-on. But intellectuals were not alone in their 
embrace of Hegel. So deeply did his teaching resonate with earlier traditions in the West, 
especially Christian eschatology, that people who have never even heard his name still 
view events from his perspective. Our culture continues to believe that visionaries will 
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lead us to a future consummation of history—a better world foreordained by the very 
nature of the universe. Yet even in Hegel’s own lifetime, some of his followers found 
the results of his program disappointing. Most people’s lives remained quite bleak and 
unlikely to get better. 
One of Hegel’s most trenchant critics was also his former student, Karl Marx, 
who complained that Hegel’s philosophy changed nothing but people’s attitudes. As 
Marx famously explained in the “Afterword” to the second German edition of Capital, 
he intended to stand Hegel’s system on its head by diminishing the role he assigned 
to consciousness:
My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. 
To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, 
under the name of “the Idea,” he even transforms into an independent subject, is the 
demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form 
of “the Idea.” With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world 
reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought. (Marx)
For Marx, Hegel’s focus on consciousness as the engine of human history concealed 
the real engine which was, Marx believed, the ongoing conflict among classes over the 
means of production. Marx’s claim to turn Hegel’s thinking on its head wasn’t just a 
witticism. It described the method he employed all his life: peering beneath ideas, so to 
speak, to expose the material reality. 
Why this history lesson now? I’ve offered it because mindfulness appears to play the 
same role in our day as the philosophy of Mind did in Hegel’s. Does Marx’s criticism 
apply to mindfulness as well? Is mindfulness another example of an ideology which 
systematically misrepresents the way things actually are? The answer would seem to 
be “yes."
Mindfulness as Ideology
It is, Marx might say, no accident that Time describes the arrival of mindfulness as a 
“revolution.” The article includes, for example, a profile of Stuart Silverman: 
. . . mindfulness has become [Silverman’s] way to deal with the 24/7 pace of his job 
consulting with financial advisers. Silverman receives hundreds of emails and phone 
calls every day. “I’m nuts about being in touch,” he says. Anxiety in the financial industry 
reached a high mark in the 2008 meltdown, but even after the crisis began to abate, 
Silverman found that the high stress level remained. So in 2011, he took a group of his 
clients on a mindfulness retreat. The group left their smartphones behind and spent 
four days at a resort in the Catskills, in upstate New York, meditating, participating 
in group discussions, sitting in silence, practicing yoga and eating meals quietly and 
mindfully. “For just about everybody there, it was a life-changing experience,” says 
Silverman. (Pickert)
Silverman calls mindfulness “life changing,” but how has his life really changed? He 
doesn’t quit his lucrative job; he doesn’t rethink his values or contemplate challenging 
established institutions. If mindfulness changes anything, it makes him more compli-
ant and productive, and less likely to be critical of the status quo. Marx might decry 
this as a textbook case of the idealist game Hegel played—substituting a “revolution” 
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in consciousness for a revolution in society. A neo-Marxist like Louis Althusser would 
take Marx’s criticism one step further, arguing that mindfulness helps “interpellate” its 
practitioners by teaching them to occupy a pre-scripted, accommodating subject posi-
tion (Althusser 127-86).
I find these arguments compelling. As the Time article goes onto explain, corpora-
tions have been eager to embrace mindfulness as a management strategy. The Catskills 
program Silverman attended, we learn, was run by a former General Mills Vice Presi-
dent, Janice Marturano, who conducted mindfulness training for more than 500 
employees before she left to oversee the for-profit Institute for Mindful Leadership, 
which has run sessions at elite venues like the annual conference in Davos. As Mar-
turano explained to the reporter from Time, modern people “feel besieged by long work 
hours and near constant connectivity. For these people, there seems to be no time to 
zero in on what’s important or plan ahead.” But Marturano apparently never thought to 
ask why companies need to demand long hours or fail to respect their employees’ private 
hours. Recently, an article in Fast Company profiled a mindfulness entrepreneur, CEO 
Rich Pierson of Headspace, whose treatment of workers was less than compassionate. 
In the words one employee, “For a company with a mission to improve the health and 
happiness of the world, we are not at all trying to improve the health and happiness of 
our world internally. You can’t cross the management. If you disagree or ask the wrong 
question, you will have a target on your forehead” (Weismann). 
But this is not the story the press likes to tell. A year before the article in Time, Wired 
magazine wrote enthusiastically about the growing influence of mindfulness in Silicon 
Valley. The article opens with this scenario:
CHADE-MENG TAN IS PERCHED ON A CHAIR, his lanky body folded into a 
half-lotus position. ‘Close your eyes,’ he says. His voice is a hypnotic baritone, slow 
and rhythmic, seductive and gentle. ‘Allow your attention to rest on your breath: The 
in-breath, the out-breath, and the spaces in between.’ We feel our lungs fill and release. 
As we focus on the smallest details of our respiration, other thoughts—of work, of 
family, of money—begin to recede, leaving us alone with the rise and fall of our chests. 
. . . . The quiet is broken a few minutes later, when Meng, as he is known, declares the 
exercise over. We blink, smile at one another, and look around our makeshift zendo—a 
long, fluorescent-lit presentation room on Google’s corporate campus in Silicon Valley. 
(Schachtman)
In the course of the article, we discover that Tan is a Google employee, his medi-
tation class one part of a company-sponsored course called Search Inside Yourself—
remember, Google is the search engine company. As the Wired reporter learns from Tan, 
the meditation program is “designed to teach people to manage their emotions, ideally 
making them better workers in the process.”
With examples like these in mind, the philosopher Slavoj Zizek has argued that 
“when ‘Western Buddhism’ presents itself as the remedy against the stressful tension of 
capitalist dynamics, allowing us to uncouple and retain inner peace and Gelassenheit, 
it actually functions as [capitalism’s] perfect ideological supplement” (“From Western 
Marxism”; see also Saari and Harni). I completely agree. Yet even Zizek seems to recog-
nize that “Buddhism” in the West’s boardrooms doesn’t look much like its Asian coun-
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terparts, and for this very reason Western entrepreneurs are leaving Buddhism itself 
behind. 
The Wired article, for example, extols strategies of “quiet contemplation” as the “new 
caffeine, the fuel that allegedly unlocks productivity and creative bursts.” Determined 
not to miss an opportunity for a competitive advantage, other Silicon Valley companies 
have followed Google’s lead. Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook and Evan Williams of Twit-
ter have both promoted mindfulness to their employees, and the two CEOs turned up 
in 2013 at the Wisdom 2.0 conference on consciousness, alongside “top executives from 
Linked-in, Cisco and Ford.” They appeared, moreover, not as members of the audience 
but in the ranks of headliners:
These companies are doing more than simply seizing on Buddhist practices. 
Entrepreneurs and engineers are taking millennia-old traditions and reshaping them 
to fit the Valley’s goal-oriented, data-driven, largely atheistic culture. Forget past 
lives; never mind nirvana. The technology community of Northern California wants 
return on its investment in meditation. ‘All the woo-woo mystical stuff, that’s really 
retrograde,’ says Kenneth Folk, an influential meditation teacher in San Francisco. ‘This 
is about training the brain and stirring up the chemical soup inside.’ (Schachtman)
Getting rid of “mystical woo-woo stuff” means teaching meditation in a way that 
will support the values of Silicon Valley and its unique form of capitalism, which manu-
factures novel strategies for monetizing information. The most obvious irony, then, is 
that Silicon Valley generates the very distractions meditation promises to help us cope 
with. But the entrepreneurs touting the benefits of mindfulness see it as a means to an 
end, and the end is greater profitability, not the creation of a cultural milieu more con-
ducive to mental health or social wellbeing.
Kenneth Folk—the meditation teacher who dismisses Buddhist tradition as retro-
grade—may sound like an outlier, but he follows in the footsteps of the leading apostle 
of mindfulness, the Harvard psychologist Jon Kabat-Zinn, on record as stating that 
“mindfulness has nothing to do with Buddhism” (Morris). Within the Buddhist com-
munity, Kabat-Zinn’s critics have accused him of wanting to have it both ways, rubbing 
elbows with the Dalai Lama and Thich Nhat Hanh while also helping to decontextual-
ize the ancient practices of mental cultivation. The article in Time says so quite point-
edly when it attributes the success of mindfulness to what it calls “smart marketing”: 
Kabat-Zinn and other proponents are careful to avoid any talk of spirituality when 
espousing mindfulness. Instead, they advocate a commonsense approach: think of your 
attention as a muscle. As with any muscle, it makes sense to exercise it (in this case, with 
meditation), and like any muscle, it will strengthen from that exercise. (Pickert)
Kabat-Zinn, in other words, has turned mindfulness into a commodity like yoga, 
even though Buddhist tradition understands the practice as a preliminary stage in a far 
more comprehensive program that requires years of dedicated effort to complete. And 
the goal isn’t extra hours at work, but liberation from the mistaken belief in an isolated 
self. The Buddha famously walked away from wealth and power, and the monks and 
nuns who follow his example are celibate, live collectively and are prohibited from even 
touching money. Buddhism played an oppositional role in both India and China, reject-
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ing caste and the legitimacy of the mandarins, but opposition is not at all the role Kabat-
Zinn and others want to play.
The Problem of Post-Reality
The Marxist case against mindfulness as an ideology seems overwhelming at first 
glance. But Kabat-Zinn and his fellow entrepreneurs may have beaten Marx at his own 
game of standing idealism on its head. The popularity of mindfulness is just one exam-
ple of a larger contemporary development even the best thinkers of our time have yet 
to fully theorize: the elite no longer believe in beliefs. The most candid description of 
this development was recorded by the journalist Ron Suskind during his 2004 interview 
with an anonymous member of George Bush’s inner White House circle:
[You people] believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible 
reality. That’s not the way the world works anymore. We are an empire now, and when 
we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality– judiciously as 
you will—we’ll act again, creating other new realties, which you can study too. And, 
that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left 
to just study what we do. (Suskind)
Suskind’s source belittled what he called the “reality based community” because 
he and his fellow White House insiders regarded beliefs as contingent, tactical and, 
finally, unreal: all that matters are pragmatic results—in other words, winning. And 
this reductionism, widely embraced, makes social change nearly impossible because any 
program of reform has to rely on ideals of some kind. You can’t argue for equality with 
people who don’t believe that such a thing exists. You can’t defend the idea of justice 
with people who see “justice” as nothing more than a clever way for losers to get over 
on the winners. Politicians on the right and the liberal left continue to mouth words 
like “freedom” and “opportunity,” but we know they understand those words as empty 
tropes they employ in the struggle for advantage. Even to speak of the American elite 
as “capitalists” assumes that they remain committed to some abstract set of principles, 
when the disaster that has overtaken us is far worse than the triumph of the “market” as 
a philosophy. America’s current version of pragmatism acts like a corrosive acid that dis-
solves every idea we might throw in its path, and it has gained this power because, ulti-
mately, all ideas are indeed abstractions and none of them can fully represent the real. 
By staking out as their home turf this gap between the idea and the reality, America’s 
elite have joined the company of the Chinese Communist Party and the Russian state, 
institutions we might define as post-ideological because their commitments—even to 
capitalism—are strategic, not principled. 
Now we can begin to understand why mindfulness exerts such a powerful appeal 
over corporate America. Promising access to a here-and-now unobstructed by language, 
culture and history, mindfulness offers the elite a pedagogy perfectly compatible with 
their post-reality pragmatism. 
Of course, we haven’t actually escaped reality. Climate change, the Sixth Great 
Extinction and a growing income gap will impose limits on us whether or not we accept 
them as real. All that mindfulness can do is postpone a rude awakening. But Sus-
kind’s anonymous source has a point when it comes to facts—facts don’t tell us what 
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they mean or how we should respond to them. Marx was badly mistaken, then, when 
he assumed that facts would settle everything. Yet Hegel was mistaken too because he 
believed that when the facts let us down, the proper exercise of our minds will show us 
the way to wisdom. Judging from mindfulness, I would say that Hegel’s confidence in 
Mind is naive. And so we find ourselves in this predicament: both of our alternatives 
have failed—mind training as well as materialism. 
Where are we supposed to go next? 
Critical Thinking after Reality
“Post-reality” sounds like a new predicament, but we’ve been here before as well. 
Writing in nineteenth century, Marx felt certain his new methodology could dissolve 
illusions of every kind, clearing the way for the victory of the proletariat as the only 
class that truly stood to benefit from recognizing the truth. As he and Frederick Engels 
announced in the Communist Manifesto, “What the bourgeoisie . . . produces, above all, 
is its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable” 
(Marx and Engels). By the 1930s, however, actual events had failed to conform to the 
trajectory Marx imagined. The Soviet version of materiality gave birth to a totalitarian 
state unlike anything the world had ever seen before. Meanwhile, in Western Europe 
and the United States, the masses willingly embraced a different kind of materiality—
what Marx called the “fetishism” of “commodities.” Under its spell, even Germany, the 
most educated and technologically advanced nation at the time, had not only failed to 
become the staging ground for a global shift to socialism, but was swiftly plunging into 
the most terrifying barbarity. 
One response to these events was the creation of the Institute for Social Research 
at the Goethe University in Frankfurt—now known as the Frankfurt School. For the 
Frankfurt theorists, whose most important work coincides with Hitler’s rise to power, 
the question was not simply, “Where did Marx go wrong?” but an even more sweeping 
one: “Two centuries after the Enlightenment, how has modern society come to seem 
more, not less, irrational?” How could rationality itself serve to arm unreason with 
new weapons, a possibility never foreseen by Marx or by Enlightenment thinkers he 
admired—Descartes, Locke and Kant. 
In works like the Critique of Instrumental Reason and the Dialectic of Enlighten-
ment, two of the leading Frankfurt theorists, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, 
attempted to answer these questions. The problem they identified was that reason had 
overlooked its own irrational presuppositions:
The aporia which faced us in our work thus proved to be the first matter we had to 
investigate: the self-destruction of enlightenment. We have no doubt . . . that freedom 
in society is inseparable from enlightenment thinking. We believe we have perceived 
with equal clarity, however, that the very concept of that thinking . . . already contains 
the germ of the regression which is taking place everywhere today. If enlightenment 
does not [engage in] reflection on this regressive moment, it seals its own fate . . . . In 
the mysterious willingness of the technologically educated masses to fall under the spell 
of any despotism, in its self-destructive affinity to nationalist paranoia . . . the weakness 
of contemporary theoretical understanding is evident. (Horkheimer and Adorno xvi).
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From one perspective, the institutions of the modern world—the economy, govern-
ment, the legal system and the media—looked thoroughly rational and modern. Science 
and technology, after all, had revolutionized the self-understanding of many millions 
of people while completely transforming their material lives. But, at the same time, the 
process of modernization allowed the transmission of irrationality through what Hork-
heimer and Adorno rather vaguely described as “the very concept of . . . thinking.” 
At this point, the two men were still looking for new ways to extend the scope 
of rationality. And like other members of the Institute, they looked to sociology and 
anthropology for an understanding of “culture”—still a new concept at the time—and 
to the structures of experience that culture transmits intersubjectively. Their turn to 
culture allowed them to see that the problem they faced was actually much worse than 
they supposed at first: not simply the persistence of an unreason embedded in traditional 
attitudes but the rise of a powerful “culture industry” that used the new mass media to 
inundate the populace with mystifying misrepresentation of the way things were. The 
images shown on the silver screen, celebrated in popular fan magazines, or narrated in 
dime store novels appealed to people’s legitimate desire for a better world while leaving 
the status quo unchallenged and unchanged—in particular economic inequality and the 
political monopoly enjoyed by the elite. Precisely because these images were so pervasive 
and appealing, they made it more and more difficult for ordinary people to separate fact 
from fantasy. 
Living in the age of Donald Trump, we can recognize the influence of the culture 
industry, its power now extended and magnified by the new electronic media. But the 
media alone can’t fully account for Trump or his adherents, since we all participate in 
the same culture without all becoming Trump supporters. Convinced that these differ-
ences require more granular explanations than the idea of culture alone can provide, 
Horkheimer and Adorno turned to another emerging discipline—Freudian psychology. 
The shift to Freud marks a new stage in School’s development: the introduction of 
the idea of the mind—consciousness again—as something separate and much more 
complex than both reason and culture. Freud’s understanding of the mind—and key 
ideas like repression, sublimation, transference, displacement and defense mecha-
nisms—gave the Frankfurt theorists analytical tools far more nuanced than any prior 
thinking on the subject. Of particular value to them was Freud’s structural model of the 
psyche, which he divided into id, ego and supergo. The id—which has no place in the 
mind as imagined by the Enlightenment, or, for that matter, by early anthropology—
allowed Horkeimer and Adorno to explain finally how reason and unreason could co-
exist. As Freud described it, the id was reason’s opposite:
It is the dark, inaccessible part of our personality, what little we know of it we have 
learned from our study of the dreamwork and of course the construction of neurotic 
symptoms, and most of that is of a negative character and can be described only as a 
contrast to the ego. We approach the id with analogies: we call it a chaos, a cauldron full 
of seething excitations. . . . It is filled with energy reaching it from the instincts, but it 
has no organization, produces no collective will, but only a striving to bring about the 
satisfaction of the instinctual needs subject to the observance of the pleasure principle. 
(Freud 91-92)
Spellmeyer / The Politics of Consciousness
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To Horkheimer and Adorno, it seemed obvious at first that the id was the culture 
industry’s staunchest ally and capitalism’s greatest strength. The way to combat its 
influence was something like Freudian analysis, but applied to the study of the whole 
society. Armed with the Freudian model, cultural Marxism could bring to conscious-
ness our most irrational impulses. For a few years, at least, this possibility held enor-
mous promise.
But gradually, they came to rethink their position—and to reject a key element of 
Freud’s therapeutic program. In his later work, Adorno as well as his younger colleague 
Herbert Marcuse broke with Freud over the role of the id, which becomes for them 
the true agent of liberation. In Negative Dialects, Adorno argues that reason cannot 
play an emancipatory role precisely because the ego has been so thoroughly colonized 
by the superego—the dominant values of society—that its own introspection 
becomes distorting and inauthentic. In trying to understand ourselves, we have little 
choice except to rely on the categories offered by our culture, which we internalize so 
thoroughly they can feel natural and freely chosen. All the while, we remain largely 
unaware of the prodigious labor of repression required for living as we are expected to. 
Adorno repairs, then, 
The dawning sense of freedom feeds upon the memory of the archaic impulse 
not yet steered by any solid I. The more the I curbs that impulse, the more chaotic 
and thus questionable will it find the pre-temporal freedom. Without [a recollection] 
of the untamed impulse that precedes the ego—an impulse later banished to the zone 
of unfree bondage to nature—it would be impossible to derive the idea of freedom. 
(Adorno,  Negative Dialectics 221-22)
Adorno’s point here deserves a second look because he says that the persistence of the 
id explains why a desire for freedom survives in spite of society’s ability to control even 
our “private” thoughts. While capitalism found a way to make reason into its instru-
ment, it can’t fully colonize the id (see also O’Connor 110-46). 
Adorno, then, finally turns his back on the Enlightenment idea of reason as transpar-
ent to itself, though reason still has a role to play, one that’s purely critical or “negative.” 
The praxis of negative dialectics requires a continuous effort to liberate the id by weaken-
ing the power of society over the ego. And critical reason effects this weakening by con-
stantly exposing contradictions between society’s totalizing claims and the lived reality. 
Beyond Negative Dialectics to Zen
Adorno’s thinking has had an enormous effect on the left-Progressive and Marxist 
traditions in the West for more than fifty years. Only recently, the Guardian featured 
a series of articles on the contemporary relevance of the Frankfurt School (Thompson). 
The New Yorker has published an article, too (Ross). Yet Trump and his allies might have 
little to fear from a method that exploits the gaps and inconsistencies in our normative 
social script. I would even say they’re masters of the art. Negativity has gone mainstream.
One way out of this cul-de-sac is Marcuse’s attempt to affirm the revolutionary poten-
tial of the pleasure principle, which could, he argued in Eros and Civilization, overthrow 
capitalism by rejecting the imperative of repressive self-discipline (Marcuse 197-221). So, 
far this hasn’t happened. If anything, the pleasure principle appears to lend itself quite 
readily to consumerism. But another, and to my mind, more promising avenue can be 
10
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found in the work of the philosopher Nikolas Kompridis, who has argued that Adorno 
failed to push his thinking far enough: when we employ critical reason to dismantle our 
presuppositions, we aren’t left nowhere, as Adorno assumes, with nothing or pure “nega-
tivity.” The act of clearing away reveals something new—a moment of “world disclo-
sure” (254-80).
Kompridis moves from this insight to a rediscovery of the Romantic tradition, but 
his ideas open up other avenues as well, including one he doesn’t consider: a form of 
Buddhist meditation quite different from mindfulness—Zen—although the two often 
get conflated by the popular press. No one who knows Adorno’s work can doubt he 
would react to this claim with hostility. And, indeed, he did in the sixties: 
The corny exoticism of such decorative world views as the astonishingly consumable 
Zen Buddhist . . . casts light upon today’s restorative philosophies. Like Zen, they 
simulate a thinking posture which [historical differences make it] impossible to 
assume. Restricting the mind to thoughts open and attainable at the historical stage of 
its [immediate] experience is an element of freedom; nonconceptual vagary represents 
the opposite of freedom. Doctrines which heedlessly run off from the subject to the 
universe . . . . are more easily brought into accord with the world’s hardened condition 
. . . than is the tiniest bit of self-reflection by a subject pondering upon itself and its real 
captivity. (qtd. in Nelson 296)
It’s worth remembering, however, that Adorno had a similar reaction to jazz, which 
is surely one of this country’s most sophisticated and inspiring contributions to world 
culture. Adorno called it “primitive” (Adorno, “On Jazz” 47).
Despite Adorno’s condemnation, Zen’s understanding of the mind has remarkable 
parallels to the account we find in Negative Dialectics. Just as Adorno and Marcuse 
looked to the id as the agent of liberation, so Zen’s yogacara psychology, recognizing that 
our conscious lives draw their content and their form from the dominant culture, turns 
to a deeper stratum of the mind which it calls the “alaya vijnana” or storehouse con-
sciousness. Like Freudian psychoanalysis, the yogacara school recognizes something like 
a process of stratification which stores conscious experience as accessible or inaccessible 
memories—what the yogacara calls “seeds” (Lusthaus, “What is Yogacara,” also Bud-
dhist Phenomenology). Unlike Freud, however, and more like the late Adorno, yogacara 
posits a deeper psychic core preserving, as Adorno puts it, “an untamed impulse that 
precedes the ego.” This untamed impulse, however, yogacara psychology holds in even 
higher esteem than Adorno does, some yogacarins even calling it the tathagatagarbha,” 
the “womb of the Buddhas” (King 19-21). It is the tathagathagarbha that allows Zen 
practitioners to see their situation more comprehensively—provided they find a way to 
short-circuit the ego and with it, their cultural conditioning. And Zen does so by using 
contradiction in much the same way as Adorno recommends.
I would suggest, however, that Zen also teaches us how to achieve just what Kom-
pridis proposes—moving through contradiction to a “disclosure of the world,” an open-
ing to new possibilities for understanding and action. But the key word here is “moving 
through.” If mindfulness focuses so narrowly on a unitive here-and-now that no space 
is left for anything else, the life of Zen comes from contradiction. It’s certainly true that 
the experience of contradiction leads temporarily to feelings of loss or emptiness, but 
disjunction makes disclosure possible, in a manner that is something like the “gestalt 
Spellmeyer / The Politics of Consciousness
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switch” first described by the Berlin School of psychology. One illustration of this pro-
cess appears in a story, a koan, used in the training of Zen students. Like many koans, 
this story describes an encounter between a Zen master and a monk. 
At this time, the master, Joshu, had become legendary in Zen circles for the depth 
of his insight. Following the death of Joshu’s teacher, Nansen, many Chinese expected 
that Joshu would succeed him as the abbot of the temple, but instead Joshu set out on 
the road, encountering other Zen teachers and their students. Like everyone whose repu-
tation has preceded him, Joshu was often welcomed with respect, but sometimes, as on 
this occasion, a monk would greet him skeptically. Here’s the exchange:
A monk said to Joshu, ‘The stone bridge of Joshu is widely renowned, but coming here 
I find only a set of steppingstones.’ Joshu said, ‘You only see the steppingstones yet the 
stone bridge is right here, before your eyes.’ The monk said, ‘What are you calling a 
“stone bridge”?’ In reply, Joshu said, ‘It lets donkeys cross over and horses cross over.’ 
(Sekida 291-93, translation altered) 
Joshu’s teaching of the “stone bridge” refers to the situation in China when this con-
versation took place. The Anji bridge close to the monastery was an engineering marvel, 
built two hundred years earlier, but the spirit that produced it had been lost. Both Joshu 
and the monk were born in the decades following the worst civil conflict in Chinese his-
tory, the An Lushan Rebellion, which, according to some historians, killed a third of the 
population and left the Middle Kingdom on life support. In less than a hundred years, 
the dynasty would fall. Most people couldn’t see a “bridge” of any kind, a way forward 
from disaster to a better place. And this situation resembles ours today, when no one can 
believe in anything because everything we once believed in has failed. 
When the monk challenges Joshu, he says, in effect, “You’re a great Zen master who’s 
supposed to know the way into the future, but what I see here goes nowhere. You’re just 
as clueless as I am.” We might expect a person like Joshu, with a reputation for insight, 
to say something profound, but instead his answer sounds cryptic and banal: “It lets 
donkeys cross over and horses cross over.” 
The harder we try to interpret this response, the more quickly we will reach the point 
where we lose confidence in any reading we might give. Every construal will eventu-
ally seem contrived and unconvincing. But the failure of our skill as interpreters takes 
us to the place Adorno had in mind when he wrote, “Thought as such . . . is an act of 
negation, of resistance to that which is forced upon it” (Adorno, Negative Dialectics 19). 
At this moment, new possibilities can arise precisely because we have exhausted all the 
stock solutions. Only uncertainty has this power.
In this condition of uncertainty, which Zen calls mu-shin or “mind of emptiness,” 
we undergo an experience of loss which is both cognitive and existential. We would like 
our uncertainty to be followed by some kind of solution, but as long we expect the solu-
tion to be there, waiting for us fully formed, we will keep facing a blank wall. Instead, 
we need to actively create the new coherence—the bridge—we’re looking for. But how 
can we create it when our best ideas have all gone down in flames? 
As Joshu knew, however, our creativity has a deeper source. He believed in the exis-
tence of something like Adorno’s “untamed impulse that precedes the ego,” an impulse 
we can access only when we exhaust our presuppositions. Then, in emptiness, a solution 
will appear, though not from the part of the mind that thinks, because it can only think 
12
JAEPL, Vol. 23, Winter 2017–2018
what it knows already. Instead, the answer comes from a deeper place, the “womb of the 
Buddhas” or what the Romantic thinkers called “imagination.”
The monk, meanwhile, is still waiting passively for the bridge to present itself, but 
this passivity is the worst of all the injuries done to us by our materialism, which teaches 
us that the phenomenal world exists without our own participation. In fact, perception 
requires us to select, from a torrent of raw sensations, the elements we combine into 
“reality,” consciously and unconsciously. The world actually exists, of course, but we 
create our image of it, and because we exist within society—within language, culture 
and history—we create this image collaboratively unless we are actively dissuaded. If the 
myth of an objective reality serves any function, it exists to convince we have no part to 
play and should content ourselves with observing. 
Mindfulness as practiced in the United States trains people to become observers of 
this kind, contemplating a world of objects they have had no part in creating. Merging 
ego into superego, mindfulness suppresses contradictions that arise when culture con-
flicts with our experience or with itself. These contradictions, we know too well, gener-
ate anxiety, anger and fear, to say nothing of disorders and pathologies that send people 
to their therapists, local bars or drug dealers. No wonder people try to repress them! Yet 
only contradictions make meaning possible, since “meaning” is the coherence we cre-
ate out of discontinuity. If mindfulness is a pedagogy, the same can be said of Zen, but 
Zen is a pedagogy that wakes us up, instead of telling us to sleep. And in that case, our 
real work as teachers begins with placing contradictions at the center of the class—in 
the lessons we craft and the readings we assign. And then these lessons make students 
responsible for building bridges of their own. 
ç
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